Tag Archives | Supreme Court

U.S. Supreme Court shuts down discrimination case against religious school

By on January 12, 2012 in Our Blog

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court invoked Title VII’s “ministerial exception” to toss a lawsuit filed by a teacher at a parochial school.  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC , the Court unanimously held that elementary school teacher Cheryl Perich could not sue her employer for terminating her after she threatened to sue for discrimination.  The Sixth Circuit had ruled that Perich’s suit could proceed, noting her primary functions were secular.  The fact that she was a commissioned minister, though, was dispositive for the Court.  Relying on the First Amendment, the Court explained a religious institution should not have to retain the services of a minister it no longer wishes to rule over its congregation, regardless of any potential discriminatory intent.  The fact that Perich was primarily a secular teacher was of no import, according to the Court, as she was technically a “minister.”  The Court explained:

“The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”

What is the impact of this case on most employers?  Nil.  But for religious institutions, a zone of protection against discrimination claims has been fortified.

 

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Several employment law cases are on the Supreme Court’s new docket

By on October 5, 2010 in Our Blog

Yesterday marked the beginning of the Supreme Court’s new term.  Several important employment law cases are already on the roster, so it will be important for employers to stay tuned as the Court issues its decisions.  One of the most significant cases is Staub v. Proctor Hospital, which involves the “cat’s paw” theory of liability in discrimination cases.  This theory refers to a situation where a decision-maker is merely a rubber stamp, and is influenced by a “non-decision-maker” who is biased.  Before the Court is the question of exactly when, under such a scenario, the employer os liable for discrimination.  Will the biased supervisor need to dominate the decision-making process for liability to be imputed to the employer, or is it enough that the biased supervisor merely exert some influence over the process?

Another case to watch out for hails from the Sixth Circuit, Thompson v. North American Stainless.  This case involves associational retaliation, and will answer the important question of how far such claims can reach.  The Thompson plaintiff alleged he was terminated because his fiance filed an EEOC charge.  The Sixth Circuit originally held the plaintiff had no claim, as he had not engaged in any protected activity.  (We blogged about the case at the time).  The Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case indicates it may just be ready to expand the scope of retaliation claims.

We’ll keep you posted on these and other Supreme Court employment law cases as the term gets underway.

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Obama’s second Supreme Court pick: Elena Kagan

By on May 10, 2010 in Our Blog

President Obama announced the nomination of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme Court this morning.  Ms. Kagan is the Solicitor General.  If confirmed by the Senate, she would become the third woman on the Court, as well as its youngest member, at age 50.  Obama described her as “an acclaimed legal scholar with a rich understanding of constitutional law.”  Ms. Kagan is the first nominee since the early 1970′s to never have served as a judge.  She was the Dean of Harvard Law School for many years, worked as a domestic policy advisor during the Clinton administration, and also worked for Vice President Joe Biden.

Reactions to Ms. Kagan’s nomination are somewhat mixed.  Some liberals are concerned that she would be a far less progressive thinker than Justice John Paul Stevens, whom she would replace.  Some conservatives are already labeling her as “anti-military,” referring to her attempt to ban military recruitment at Harvard during her tenure there, as a means of protesting the military’s “don’t ask don’t tell” policy towards gays.  Nonetheless, many political analysts predict a relatively smooth confirmation process.  

The dearth of a public record of Ms. Kagan’s judicial thinking will lead to increasing speculation as the nomination process unfolds.  What would a Justice Kagan mean in the world of employment law?  This is certainly an open question, and one the pundits will certainly attempt to answer in the coming weeks, as the battle lines are drawn in what promises to be a highly politicized and media-worthy issue.  Stay tuned!  


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U.S. Supreme Court Rules for White Firefighters Alleging Reverse Discrimination

By on June 30, 2009 in Our Blog

On Monday, June 29th, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, holding that the city of New Haven, Conn. discriminated against (mostly) white firefighters by scrapping a 2003 promotional exam that had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.  The case has tremendous implications for workplaces all over the country who may be grappling with the issue of when, if ever, employers may consider race in job-related decisions.  

The case is also newsworthy for another reason — it overturns would-be Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s ruling in favor of the city as a Second Circuit judge.  Just a day later, her critics are already claiming the Court’s decision somehow puts a chink in her candidate armor.  But her supporters (me among them) know that lower court judges get reversed all the time; it is intrinsic to the job.  Further, the Second Circuit’s decision in Ricci hewed closely to precedent — also part of the job description of an appellate judge.

At the core of the Court’s majority decision, written by Justice Kennedy, is the notion that by addressing a potential violation of Title VII’s disparate impact provision, as the test in question had a statistically significant negative impact on black firefighters, the City necessarily implicated Title VII’s disparate treatment provisions.  In other words, the decision to disregard the test constituted intentional discrimination against the high-scoring white firefighters.  The Court acknowledged that the City’s decision was rooted in its belief that upholding the exam results could result in liability for disparate impact.  But the Court concluded “fear of litigation alone cannot justify the City’s reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions.”  

Justice Ginsberg wrote a strong dissent, which she read from the bench.  She began by discussing the “entrenched inequality” in the firefighting profession, long known for racial imbalances.  She argued the majority decision thwarts voluntary compliance efforts, which Title VII specifically encourages.  She also rejected the majority’s pitting the disparate impact provisions of Title VII against the disparate treatment provisions.  The majority opinion held that by trying to avoid one (disparate impact), it violated the other (disparate treatment).  But Ginsberg argued this position ignores EEOC interpretive guidelines, usually afforded deference by the Court, which state “By the enactment of Title VII, Congress did not intend to expose those who comply with the Act to charges that they are violating the very statute they are seeking to implement.”  She further argued the City’s decision to scrap the test was race-neutral in the sense that firefighters of all races would have to participate in another promotional process.  Therefore, the City’s actions were unlike quotas or even race-based preferences.

Expect a flood of information, analysis, and predictions from experts on both sides of the debate in the near future.  But the immediate and obvious takeaway for employers, at least until and unless Congress steps in to legislatively revisit the decision, is that any concerns about disparate impact must be fully vetted, investigated, and analyzed — presumably at great cost — before employers take “corrective” action, lest they court disparate treatment liability.

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